Under pressure from voters, and from other parties, Europe's centre-left has had to reevaluate its position on migration. The UK Labour party is no exception. Public concern about large-scale immigration clearly contributed to its heavy defeat at the 2010 general election. Since then it has been slowly but surely hardening its stance on the issue, although this is by no means unprecedented: while the rise of UKIP may have upped the ante in recent months, Labour has a long history of adjusting policy in this area so as to remain competitive with its main rival, the Conservative party. Labour is now asking itself whether it will be possible to do this without challenging one of the fundamental precepts of EU membershipthe right of free movement of people. Whatever the result of this internal debate between the Party's 'beer drinkers' and its 'wine drinkers', Labour may still have difficulty in neutralising immigration as an issue since, for the most part, it continues to insist on giving an essentially economic answer to what for many voters is actually a cultural question.
favours electorally. They also appeal strongly to working class voters who traditionally support the left. And in countries where single party majority administrations are the exception rather than the rule, they may well help the centre-right into office, either by joining it in coalition or by providing support on confidence and supply to a minority government.
Left-of-centre responses to this 'triple challenge' vary considerably, both between countries and over time; but they can be effectively reduced to the following three idealtypical strategies. 1 The left-of-centre can try to hold its existing, relatively liberalinternationalist position by unashamedly making the case for tolerance of migration and multiculturalism. Or it can try to defuse the situation by trying to play down the issues championed by the radical right in favour of those issues (normally on the so-called 'statemarket' dimension) which favour the centre-left. Or else it can adopt the radical right's agenda and hope to close down the issue space on the other ('authoritarian-libertarian') dimension by arguing that migration must be limited and multiculturalism tempered by an increased emphasis on 'integration'; that done, politics can, fingers crossed, get back to 'normal'.
In the real world, of course, these strategies bleed into one another, although more often than not hold gives way to defuse, which then gives way to adopt, especially when a centre-left party feels the radical right might cost it not only votes but also office. Moreover, none of the strategies is risk-free. The first attracts accusations that the party has lost touch and the second that it is refusing to listen and even running away from a fight. The third strategy courts criticism (internal and external) for being illiberal, inauthentic and incredible.
Moreover, it risks not only further raising the profile of issues which are already benefiting the radical right, but also taking time and attention away from issues that it may be more profitable for the centre-left to emphasise-a possibility that Labour's election strategists are acutely aware of. However, with less than a year to go before the country goes to the polls, the party is still conflicted about how to deal with immigration and with UKIP. Both policy and rhetoric have been tightened but some are arguing that Labour has to go further-even so far as to challenge some of the basic principles of the European order that the party has bought into for the past quarter of a century.
Labour Past: Balancing Act
For most of its history, the Labour party has been untroubled by a radical right competitor, except for brief periods in the 1970s and 2000s when first the National Front and second the British National Party won a few seats from it at second-order elections. This has never, however, prevented Labour from worrying about immigration-maybe even more so (or at least for longer) than many of its sister parties in Europe. Ever since the late 1950s, the Conservatives have sought to suggest that they, rather than Labour, best represent public opinion on the issue-opinion which is for the most part ambivalent and at times actively hostile. As a result, Labour has, since the 1960s, sought to effect a balance between controlling the numbers of migrants settling in the UK-often incurring intense criticism from liberal commentators and its own progressive supporters as a consequence-and promoting, often through legislation, equality for ethnic minorities. That approach, which contrasted markedly with the Tories' more hard-line rhetoric and policies, saw Labour garner the overwhelming support of the UK's growing Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population. But it left the Conservatives with a large and durable lead on the issue in opinion polls, albeit not one which (with the possible exception of the 1970 contest) ever looked capable of helping them to win an election they might otherwise have lost. 2 
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The balancing act that had characterised Labour's stance on immigration since the 1960s broke down, however, after 1997, when a government that was already notably more relaxed about the issue than its predecessors decided not to impose transitional controls on workers from the eight states which joined the EU in 2004. As a consequence, the UK experienced an unprecedentedly intensive and utterly unplanned wave of immigration, particularly (though by no means exclusively) from Eastern and Central Europe. Realising that it was in trouble, the Labour government-under pressure from the Conservatives and from the country's predominantly right-wing print media-reacted by toughening its stance on asylum and immigration, both in word and in deed. benefits for our economy and our culture, but we also need to recognise its impact on communities. And that means strong, fair controls that are properly enforced.' 8 The same themes were at the heart of Ed Miliband's heavily trailed speech on the subject to IPPR in late June 2012. 9 But so too was the argument that, just as it had been wrong not to admit the costs as well as the benefits of immigration and to appear to be telling those who lost out to 'like it or lump it', it was equally wrong to pretend to people that 'we can close Britain off from the world, when all of us know we cannot'. Indeed, what Miliband really wanted to do (as well as slipping in a passing mention that the party might decide to keep the government's 'cap' on numbers, as well as reintroduce exit checks) was to move the argument onto what was, for him anyway, far more comfortable territory. What was needed, he claimed, was, first, to introduce 'tougher labour standards to do more to protect working people from their wages and conditions being undermined' and, second, to begin turning Britain into an economy that invested in its existing human capital and technology rather than simply sucking in low-skilled foreign labour.
As well as illustrating the possibly predictable tendency for a social democratic party to come up with an economic answer to what for many voters is largely a cultural question (and therefore a much harder one to answer), Miliband's speech was also notable for its explicit assumption that Labour could and would do nothing about free movement of labour for EU citizens. This in spite of the fact that this is a) precisely what got the Blair and Brown government's into such trouble and b) precisely why the current government, even in the unlikely event that it were to be able to cut non-EU immigration 'from the hundreds to the tens of thousands', would still be unable to do much about immigration overall-something which UKIP, of course, never misses an opportunity to point out.
This was clearly still the position when Yvette Cooper made her (first) 'big speech' on immigration in March 2013 -one which began (apparently without a trace of irony) with yet another ritual nod to immigration not only placing 'stresses and strains' on communities, but also being 'one of those difficult subjects politicians don't talk about'. After ticking a few more familiar boxes (the importance of not entering 'an arms race of rhetoric on immigration', the need for 'a serious debate' and 'practical measures', etc. etc.), Cooper did then make a move onto more cultural terrain by talking about English tests and integration strategies. But she swiftly shifted back (after another quick nod to the possibility of maintaining the cap) toward economic territory, outlining a series of specific new regulations and fines on employers of immigrants. More audaciously, however, she ended by attempting to outflank the Tories on cracking down on illegal immigrants and on EU migrants' access to financial support from the welfare state, in particular claims for jobseeker's allowance and the (to most people ridiculous) law that allows workers to get UK child benefit for their offspring living abroad. response. Miliband's was to make a heavily trailed speech in Thurrock, one of Labour's target seats where it clearly seemed to have lost support to UKIP. In it, he outlined all the changes he had made to tighten Labour's immigration policy in response to public concern which, he stressed, was not prejudiced but understandable. However, Labour under his leadership would not 'make false promises, or cut ourselves off from the rest of the world because it would be bad for Britain'.
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Publicly, Cooper's response was to produce, for the Guardian, a boiled-down version of her pre-election immigration speech. 16 Yet there was plenty of seemingly well-informed speculation among journalists that she was among a number of frontbenchers wanting to see proper controls on immigration, you have to deal with those parts of the immigrant community that are rejecting the idea of integrating into the mainstream, but to allow that then to trend into anti-immigrant feeling is a huge mistake.' He insisted that 'the way to deal with UKIP is to stand up to them and take them on. What they are putting before people is a set of solutions that anybody who analyses where Britain has to be in the 21st century knows… are regressive, reactionary and [will] make Britain's problems worse, not better.'
Should Labour move towards Farage's 'anti-European' and 'anti-immigrant platform', he continued, then 'all that will happen is that it will confuse its own supporters and will not draw any greater support'.
It is tempting when talking about Labour post-1997 to analyse these differences through the prism of the 'TB-GBs', and to see those urging Miliband not to compromise on Labour's support for freedom of movement as Blairites and those urging him to think again as Brownites. Indeed, it may not be altogether wrong. After all, it was Blair who believed that the British had to be made ready for globalisation rather than protected against it, while it was Labour's 'current policies -clamping down on dodgy agencies, enforcing minimum wage, requiring apprenticeships, tackling unregulated housing -are designed to do', only 'we are so politically correct we cannot admit that's the aim, even though that's exactly what most of our voters want to hear'. Those voters, he asserted, were not so much racist as bewildered by the pace of change, took a common-sense view that more people coming in put more pressure on scarce public resources (especially when it came to housing) and expected Labour-the party that was supposed to be about fairness and rewarding contribution-to be 'on their side'. Labour's traditional commitment to a multiracial, multicultural society did not have to mean it ignored the need for integration and nation-building. Nor did its continued commitment to EU membership mean that it could not lead the debate in Europe about changing the rules on free movement.
Denham's views were promptly attacked by the Labour's liberal progressives-whose opinions, given that they also reflect those of many of the NGOs and academics who specialise in migration, have to be taken seriously, especially by a party that claims to take evidence-based policy making seriously. 20 And, whatever the private views of some Shadow
Ministers, 'the line to take', for the moment at least, remained the one faithfully repeated by
Denham's successor as Shadow Business Secretary, Chuka Umunna, at a conference the weekend after the European election results were announced: namely that there was no future or point in Labour trying to 'out-UKIP UKIP', nor was there any question of resiling from free movement in the EU. 21 Ed Miliband, then, seems determined to hold the ring between on the one hand those who think that promising voters Labour can negotiate some sort of labour market protection for UK citizens is bound to end in tears and, on the other, those who believe-albeit reluctantly-that in the absence of such promises, Labour is going to find it awfully difficult to hold onto some of its white working-class vote.
Labour Future: Hard lines?
How long Miliband will be able to hold this line-to mediate between what in some continental social democratic parties are called the 'beer drinkers' (concerned to maintain the party's appeal to the white working class) and 'the wine drinkers' (who believe the future is liberal, not regressive)-is a moot point. One thing, though, is certain. Whether he can or can't will not depend solely on UKIP. Labour's shift on immigration since 2010, after all, has been largely driven not by Nigel Farage (who it only really began to worry about towards the latter half of 2013) but by its concern about the threat the issue poses in the hands of the Conservative party in Whitehall, Westminster and the media. UKIP may still fade, although not because, as some Labour optimists naively believe, those tempted to vote for it are put off when its policies on the NHS or tax are 'exposed': after all, as Ford and Goodwin make clear, the voters in question simply don't care anywhere near as much about those issues as they do about immigration, and anyway they don't trust Labour to deliver on them either. But if UKIP does fade, that will not necessarily mean Labour stops tightening its stance between now and the next election. The party-quite rightly-was worried before UKIP ballooned, and it will continue to worry-again quite rightly-even if it bursts. Public concern is at least in part driven by numbers as well as by political debate, and the numbers coming into the country, whether from inside or outside the EU, are not going down anything like fast enough to reassure people that things are now fully under control.
The Conservatives' lead over Labour on immigration had, according to the pollster YouGov, shrunk from twenty-nine points just after the election to just nine points at the end of May 2014. Whether this was due more to Labour's shifting position or to the fact that the government has so far proved palpably unable to deliver the real difference it promised on the issue is impossible to tell. But the Tories' election advisor, Lynton Crosby, infamous in Australia for using migration to his paymasters' advantage, is unlikely to be happy to leave it there. Anyone inclined to think that he might should look at how the government is making a great deal these days of its determination to enforce the minimum wage so as to end the exploitation of low-wage workers, thereby rendering redundant one of Labour's favourite solutions to the influx of migrant workers. They should also read the Sun. George Osborne took time out from campaigning at the Newark by-election to talk to one of its political staff for a story that ran on 1 June 2014. In the course of their chat, '[h]e vowed the Tories would put tougher curbs on EU migrants at the heart of plans to redraw our ties with Brussels. And he hinted that could see the European Union's founding principle of free movement torn up'.
Not only that: the Chancellor also felt obliged to warn voters that 'if Labour win power next year the floodgates will swing back open'. That, at least, is one accusation that Miliband and his colleagues can never allow to go unchallenged. Thurrock won't be Labour's last word on
